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MIGRATION AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY
The population of Mexico City has grown from 724,000 at the eve of the
Mexican Revolution of 1910 (Stern and Kahl 1968:11) to almost seven million in
/ 11970 (Perfil Demografico de Mexico 1971:58). The economic level (standard
of living and income) of residents of Mexico City is, by and large, better
than that of people in other parts of the country (Yates 1962; Solis 1967:
83-84). However, as the city has grown in size poverty has become more
widespread. In large part this new poverty has displaced rural poverty
(Gonzalez Cosio 1961:55).
Is the upsurge of urban poverty a temporary phenomenon, owing to the
cultural background of migrants? In this paper several possible explanations
dealing with the relationship between rural-urban background and socio-
economic status are examined among a sample of men in three lower class areas
of Mexico City. Other explanations of socio-economic status dealing with
class background and area of residence are also considered. The analysis
shows that the job status of the men interviewed depends primarily on their
education and personal contacts, not their rural-urban background or the type
of area in which they live. Their schooling and contacts, in turn, depend
largely on their social class background.2 The implications of these findings
for the future economic prospects of migrants and their offspring are
discussed in the final section of the paper.
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2METHODOLOGY
1. The Selection of the Three Urban Communities and the Sample of Residents
The data are based on a study done by the author in 1967-68 of residents
in a center city area, in an area formed by an illegally organized land
invasion, and in a low-cost housing project. The three areas, each containing
approximately 80,000 people, were chosen on the basis of consultations with
leading social scientists, housing experts and professionals familiar with
the socio-economic composition of residential sections of Mexico City;
analyses of demographic data on Mexico City; and personal visits to several
dozen areas of the city. The center city area, settled before the Conquest,
is physically deteriorated, crime-ridden and densely populated. Families
there primarily live in poorly ventilated rented rooms in one-story tenements
(vecindades).3 The squatter settlement (a colonia proletaria), formed initi-
ally in 1954, is now legally recognized by the government. It is much less
densely populated than the center city area and superficially resembles a
provincial community. The majority of people there live in 1-2 room homes
which are in various states of completion and of varying quality, depending
on the financial resources of the owners. The housing project, a spacious
and fully urbanized "community" with a variety of social services, contains
homes which are better constructed than most homes in the other two areas.
Social workers and sociology students who had interview experience
administered a formal questionnaire to 50 men in each of the areas.5 The
information used in the analysis below derives from this questionnaire. Since
no detailed household census of the areas was available from which a sample
could be drawn, a census was made of randomly selected blocks in each area.
From this census material the designated number of men were randomly selected.
3In the twelve cases when there was no male head of household and in the two
cases when men refused to collaborate with the interviewers, a neighboring
household was selected.
2. Occupational Classification
In Mexico, persons enjoy distinct economic and non-economic prerogatives
depending on their occupational group affiliation. Income, prestige and
social security benefits (which include medical insurance, compensation for
work-related disabilities, old-age pensions and job security) generally are
occupationally linked. Consequently, occupational status is used here as the
main indicator of socio-economic status. Income, subjective class identifi-
cation and education, which are sometimes used as indicators of socio-economic
status, are not used for the following reasons. Income data is highly
unreliable, as Mexicans are reluctant to report their real income. Subjec-
tive economic status does not necessarily measure objective economic status.
And, education is largely a determinant of socio-economic status, not a
defining attribute of it.
The criteria used in the classificatory schema are 1) skill and level
of technology employed; 2) scale of enterprise and 3) ownership/non-ownership
of the means of production. The criteria were selected because they were
assumed to measure the following phenomena:
skill: the complexity of the work an individual performs;
scale: the complexity of the administrative or production process in
which an individual is involved and the benefits to which he
is entitled;
ownership/non-ownership: control exercised by an individual within
his immediate work setting.
The occupational categories used in the analysis below are ones based on the
following combinations of these three factors:
a. Peon, unskilled, semi-skilled worker: a person employed
by someone else in a place employing less than twenty
4persons; the work done by such a person is generally believed
to require little skill in comparison to the skills demanded
of factory and white collar jobs; examples include a gardener,
domestic servant, artisan employed in a small shop, janitor,
and night watchman;
b. factory worker or unskilled worker in large enterprise: a
person employed in an enterprise with twenty or more employees,
as a factory hand or in some other manual capacity; the work
he does generally requires skill and coordination of labor
with other workers;
c. salaried white collar employee: a person not independently
employed; the work he does generally offers job security,
requires some formal training and is defined as non-manual;
examples include bureaucrats, secretaries and shop clerks
in stores;
d. independently employed:
(1) penny capitalist: a person self-employed without hired
assistance; he lacks resources, and possibly also training
requisite for jobs in industry and administration; examples
include independent artisans and market vendors;
(2) small businessman or professional with little specialized
training: a person who is self-employed, with sufficient skill
and resources (e.g., hired capital, employees, technology) to
define himself as a proprietor, e.g., proprietors of artisan
shops and stores; non-certified or minimally qualified
professionals, e.g., non-titled doctors and lawyers; since
there are few persons in the sample so employed, they are
considered in the following analysis together with the penny
capitalists.6
The occupational categories are logically distinct, and in the analysis
are not scaled or ranked. The men are classified according to their principal
occupation only.7
5RURAL-URBAN BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS
Most hypotheses dealing with the relationship between rural-urban
background and economic success assume that people's economic status is primar-
ily determined by their values, norms and attitudes. Accordingly, change on
the part of individuals (e.g., in their values, norms and attitudes) generates
structural change (e.g., in technology and stratification). Several such
hypotheses are discussed below.
1. Rural-Urban Exposure
One school of thought argues that the culture of rural and urban areas
differs, and that people's economic status consequently depends on the degree
to which they are exposed to provincial communities or cities. The argument
depicts rural and urban communities as culturally distinct (Durkheim 1947;
T8nnies 1963; Redfield 1947; Wirth 1938), and people brought up in the two
types of communities as, therefore, different. For instance, people raised
in small towns and villages are said to have different and much lower expecta-
tions than people brought up in urban centers (Foster 1967; Banfield 1958).
The mass exodus to capital cities in Mexico and other Latin American countries
demonstrates th provincial people may acquire aspirations which cannot be
satisfied within the confines of their places of origin. However, they may
also have lower aspirations than people born in cities. Provincial people are
described as more culturally and socially "marginal," that is, less "integrated"
into national institutions and so-called "modern" life styles than city
dwellers (Vekemans and Giusti 1969-70; Mattelart and Garreton 196 , Cabezas
and Duran 1970; Gonzalez Casanova 1970). Assuming culture is territorially
linked and economic success culturally determined, non-migrants should be more
successful than migrants because they have been more exposed to urban values,
norms and attitudes. For similar reasons, the younger migrants are when they
6move to the city and the longer they have lived in the city, the more success-
ful they should be.
Secondly, the argument has been made that each successive generation of
city-dwellers is more successful occupationally than the preceding one,
largely because each generation is succeeded by a wave of new immigrants (e.g.,
Burgess 1925; Wirth 1928; Kitano 1969). This interpretation draws heavily on
the experience of immigrants to the United States, where the national economy
has been expanding and children of immigrants generally have been more
successful economically than their parents. As a consequence, Americans have
tended to conclude optimistically that mobility is more or less inevitable,
merely a question of time.8 Proponents of this thesis argue that poverty in
the United States has declined over the years because, on the one hand,
immigration has been cut back, and on the other hand, the offspring of immi-
grants have assimilated American middle class culture. Were this argument
correct, urban poverty would be a temporary phenomenon, owing to the recency
of mass migration to cities, and children of migrants would be more successful
economically than their parents.
Alternatively, the size of the community in which people are born or
grow up possibly influences the aspirations and expectations that migrants hold
for themselves. The size of community in which people are born and raised
could be important not only because different cultural ethos prevail in
different sized communities, but also because education and occupational oppor-
tunities vary according to the size of communities. Different objective
opportunities may affect the range of jobs with which people become familiar,
people's career orientations and their actual career opportunities (Lipset and
Bendix 1967:23-26). Whether viewed in cultural or structural terms, if the
type or size of community in which people grow up sets limits on their "life
7chances," then the earlier in life that people are exposed to large metropoles,
the more successful they should be in the long run. They thereby have more
time to acquire the values and skills which would drive them and enable them
to take advantage of urban economic opportunities.
More recently, however, studies have suggested that the nature of people's
social contacts has a greater impact on people's values, norms and attitudes
and "life chances" than the physically delineated community in which they live
or were raised.(Lewis 1965; Gans 1962; especially 197-226). For example, city-
dwellers who maintain close contact with paisanos (fellow villagers) in the
provinces or cities may be less inclined to forget values and customs generally
regarded as provincial than city-dwellers who do not have such contacts. If
rural culture is a major impediment to economic development in rural areas,
than city-dwellers would have to abandon such "rural" beliefs and customs
before they could prosper in the city.
Were occupational fate largely a function of rural-urban upbringing,
then among our sample of men we would expect to find that:
a. the men raised in Mexico City are more successful occupationally
than those raised in provincial Mexican communities [since we have no data on
the number of generations that the families of men born in Mexico City have
lived in the City, we cannot verify whether each generation of City-born men
is more successful than the one preceding];
b. the earlier in life men migrated and the longer they have lived in
Mexico City, the more successful they now are; and
c. the less contact the men presently have with the provinces or with
people who live in the provinces, the more economically successful they are.
The experiences of the men living in the thre. areas under study
disprove each of these theses 9 (Table 1). Job-wise, the migrants from small
towns compete favorably with those who have lived in the capital all their lives.
8TABLE 1
OCCUPATION OF MEN IN THE THREE AREAS
ACCORDING TO PROVINCIALISM
Semi and
unskilled Indepen- Factory/ Salaried
in small dently large non-
enterprises employed enterprise manual
Size town when 15a
less than 10,000
10,000/less than
Federal District
Federal District
Age migratedb
didn't migrate
1-15 years old
16-29
30 or over
Time lived in
Federal District c
5 years or less
6-15 years
16-29 years
30 or more years
If ever see peopledwho
live in provinces
If ever go to
provincese
Based on the questions: a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
*"N" is less than 5.
24%*
13%*
26%
35
38
29
26%
22%*
24%
14%
33%*
22%
18%
27%
27%
26
39
29
50
33*
22
27
28
28
12*
25
21
22
17*
22
21*
33*
33
20
19
19
29 100%
(17)
25
25
26
22*
24
14*
22
26
26
101%
(24)
101%
(94)
100%
(77)
100%
(18)
99%
(41)
99%
(14)
99%
(6)
99%
(18)
101%
(51)
100%
(74)
26 100%
(96)
21% 26 24 29 100%
(110)
"Where did you live when you were fifteen?"
"How old were you when you came to Mexico City?"
"What is your age?" and "How old were you when you
came to Mexico City?"
"Do you have close relatives or friends who live in
the provinces? IF YES: "How frequently do you see
them?"
"How frequently do you go to the provinces?"
Total
9Those who were raised in areas with few occupational opportunities are not now
at a disadvantage economically. They are as likely as men who grew up in
Mexico City to have white collar jobs. Moreover, close contact with the hinter-
land does not seem to jeopardize the men's job prospects as most men, indepen-
dently of the type of work they do, periodically go to the provinces to visit
people who live there. While people with rural contacts might have experienced
more occupational mobility had they confined their contacts to Mexico City
residents, certainly periodic exposure to rural society has not had the negative
economic effect assumed by some. The one rural-urban factor which apparently
has a decisive bearing on the men's job prospects is the age at which they
migrate. Men over thirty who move to the capital have difficulty finding
employment. Yet it is undoubtedly their age, not their rural origin, which puts
them at a disadvantage. Employers discriminate against middle-aged people,
particularly those over forty, be they of urban or rural origin.
2. The Selectivity of Migrants
Other social scientists argue that it is not migrant background per se
which determines occupational success within cities but the socio-economic
background of migrants: the more education migrants have, the more economi-
cally successful they are likely to be10 (Browning 1968). This thesis is
premised on the assumption that education is a main criterion by which people
are selected for jobs. It allows for the fact that people raised within any
given type of community or any given sized community are not socially and
culturally homogeneous, and that they therefore are not likely to do equally
well economically if they migrate.
If this thesis is correct, migrants should be more successful economically
than city-born people (or those who migrated before they were fifteen) if they
are more educated, and they should be as successful as city-born people if they
10
TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RURAL-URBAN BACKGROUND AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, HOLDING EDUCATION CONSTANT
Less than 6 years
of schoolinga
More than 6 years
of schooling
Did not migrate/
migrated when
less than 16
_years oldb
Migrated
when 16+
years old
Occupation
Did not migrate/
migrated when
less than 16
years old
Migrated
when 16+
years old
semi/unskilled
job small scale
enterprise
independently
employed
factory/large
enterprise
salaried non-
manual
Total
37%
26%
22%
15%
29%
41%
21%
9%
100%
(46)
45%
21%
24%
ll%*
100%
(34)
101%
(38)
Based on the questions: a. "How much schooling have you had?"
b. "Where did you live when you were 15?"
*"N" is less than 5.
35%
30%
22%
13%*
100%
(23)
11
are equally educated. As shown in Table 2, migrants fare comparatively well
in the City. The men with six or more years of schooling who grew up in Mexico
City are less likely to be salaried white collar workers than the men with
comparable education who migrated when they were sixteen years or older. Like-
wise, the men with less than a primary school education who grew up in the
capital tend to do no better occupationally than those who migrated as adults
(sixteen or more years old).
Hence, the men's socio-economic status is not attributable to their rural
or urban background, but to their educational achievement. In the next section
we examine the extent to which their economic status is a function of their
socio-economic background and the general nature of the production process.
12
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
1. Education, Personal Contacts and Class Background
Capitalist economies for the most part are oriented towards maximizing
profit, and profit is associated with productivity. Productivity in turn depends
largely on skill, for skill affects the uses to which capital are put. To the
extent that skills are acquired through schooling, capitalists would be likely
to vary in their success according to their training and they would be likely
to give preference in hiring to educated workers, particularly when jobs require
expertise. Consequently, even though capitalists can directly transfer their
line of work on to their children, they would be motivated to educate their
children. Likewise, non-capitalists would be motivated to educate their children
well so that their children can attain socially and economically rewarding jobs,
particularly since they cannot directly pass on their line of work to their
children. However, families are unlikely to be equally able to afford keeping
their children out of the work force and therefore not equally able to educate
their children. The more successful that parents are economically, the more
likely are they to be able to afford educating their children and the more
successful their children, in turn, are likely to be. Contrary to Marx,
education may be more important than property ownership in determining most
people's "life chances," especially if most coveted jobs cannot be directly
inherited.
People differ not only in their ability but also in their desire to have
their children follow in their footsteps. For instance, small-scale capitalists
(self-employed persons whose labor generates little income) could directly pass
on their line of work to their children. However, in contrast to medium and
large-scale capitalists, they are not likely to wish their occupational fate
13
on their children, for they enjoy little social and economic security.
Similarly, manual workers who enjoy little social and economic security, would
not be likely to wish their occupational fate on their children.
There is also reason to believe, however, that people are hired on the
basis of so-called "particularistic" criteria as well, especially when coveted
jobs are scarce. Among people equally qualified for jobs, employers may prefer
to hire persons known either to them or to someone working for them as such
workers are more likely to be loyal and cooperative when offered a job than
workers hired through impersonal channels.11 Should people's social contacts
in general and job contacts in particular primarily be with persons of their
own socio-economic class,12 this informal mechanism, in addition, would serve
to perpetuate differential access to jobs from one generation to the next
along family lines.
Among the sample of men, those with the socially and economically most
rewarding jobs tend to be the most educated3 (Table 3A). The salaried white
collar employees generally have at least a primary school education (six or
more years of schooling). However, a primary school education in itself does
not guarantee the men white collar jobs (Table 3B). Education is a less
important prerequisite for factory work than white collar work, but clearly
factory workers are more educated than artisans. Almost as many independently
employed men pursuing entrepreneurial activities rarely seem to do so by choice,
for only about 6% of them want their children to follow in their footsteps.
They apparently pursue such work because job opportunities have not increased
in response to the changing skill level of the population.15 Since they prefer
self-employment to the jobs available, they start their own small businesses --
utilizing their limited capital and skills. Not all independently employed men,
however, have an education. In contrast to the other small-scale entrepreneurs,
14
TABLE 3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION
AMONG MEN IN THE THREE AREAS
Educationa
some
none primary pri
Occupation
A. percentaged on occupation
semi and unskilled in
small enterprise
independently
employed
factory/large
enterprise
salaried
non-manual
TOTAL
B. percentaged on education
semi and unskilled in
small enterprise
independently employed
factory/large
enterprise
salaried
non-manual 16* 11
TOTAL 101% 99%
(19) (61)
aClassification based on the question: "How much schooling
Primary school consists of six grades.
*"N" is less than 5.
nary
28
42
47
72
46%
(70)
Total
101%
(36)
101%
(46)
100%
(32)
99%
(36)
14% 2
27 3
21 2
37 2
99% 10
(70)
have you had?"
4%
1
1
4
0%
(150)
6%*
24%
9%*
8%*
13%
(19)
1l%*
58
16*
67
35
44
19
41%
(61)
39%
26
23
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these men probably 'were unable to secure other work since employers (according
to Table 3A) rarely hire uneducated men. While these "penny capitalists"
generally lack skills and capital, they have few options but to pursue such
activities in order to subsist. Schooling, in sum, seems generally to be a
necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for well-paying and prestigious jobs.
In view of the schooling the men would like their children to obtain, their
personal regret that they themselves did not acquire more formal training, and
the importance they attribute to education as a channel of mobility, it seems
unlikely that they are poorly educated by choice.16 Class background appears
to be a primary obstacle to schooling. For one, the men in the sample of
highest occupational status entertain the highest educational aspirations and
expectations for their children, no doubt because they can best afford to keep
their children out of the work force.17 Secondly, the quality and quantity of
school facilities seems to reinforce the importance family background has on
children's education, for government school allocations are class biased. For
instance, school facilities are inequitably distributed between rich and poor
regions of the country (Myers 1965), urban and rural communities (Myers 1965),
and rich and poor sections within cities.18 However, without knowing the nature
of school facilities in the communities where and when the men in the sample
grew up, we cannot determine the extent to which the men interviewed were
handicapped by the government's inegalitarian school policy. Nevertheless,
given the national pattern one can assume that it was important for at least
some of the men, particularly those of rural origin.19 To the extent that it
was important, formal as well as informal pressures have restricted the educa-
tion opportunities of the men. And differences in school facilities within the
three areas suggest that the same forces seem to be affecting the educational
prospects of the men's children.
In addition, personal contacts are crucial for jobs, particularly for
16
ones in the "modern" sector of the economy. For instance, about 38% of the
men with factory and white collar jobs said they obtained their work through a
personal acquaintance, whereas only one-fourth of the men in small-scale
enterprises said they obtained their jobs in this manner. Although the men
are not entirely restricted in their close contacts to people of their own
socio-economic strata, those employed as factory and white collar workers are
friendliest with persons holding jobs of comparable status (Table 4). Conse-
quently, the men's range of job contacts tend to be class-linked. Since the
men rely primarily on kin to help them secure work and since kin tend to be
of similar socio-economic background, personal contacts generally serve to
perpetuate differential access to jobs from one generation to the next along
family lines, just as schooling does. 2 0
2. Prior Job Experience, Age and Present Occupational Success
An analysis which focuses on channels of recruitment at a single point
in time overlooks the mobility that people experience within the course of their
lifetime. The apparent importance of class of origin could merely be a function
of the particular time at which the investigation was done.2 1
However, the men in fact seem not to undergo much vertical intragenera-
tional mobility.22 While we do not have data on their entire work histories,
a comparison of the last two jobs the men have held reveals that most men
have either experienced no mobility or "horizontal" mobility (that is, jobs
within the same occupational category); that once men secure white collar
status they rarely forsake it; and that factory workers who are vertically
mobile are more downwardly mobile than upwardly mobile23 (Table 5).
If people do not experience much job mobility within their lifetimes,
the jobs available when they entered the labor force may affect their entire
TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF CLOSE NETWORK
MEMBERS AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF MEN IN THE THREE AREAS
(Percentaged on men's occupations)
semi and un-
skilled in
small enterprise
independently
employed_
factory/
enterprise
salaried
non-manual
% with any of 3 closesta
Relatives who are non-manual
Godparents who are non-manual
Friends who are non-manual
Relatives, godparents or
friends who are non-manual
Relatives who are factory workers
Godparents who are factory workers
Friends who are factory workers
Relatives, godparents or
friends who are factory workers
26%
(35)
20%
(35)
17%
(36)
47%
(34)
26%
(35)
23%
(35)
52%
(36)
(34)
26%
(43)
25%
(44)
32%
(44)
60%
(40)
31%
(43)
32%
(44)
53%
(44)
23%
(40)
31%
(29)
22%
(32)
25%
(32)
52%
(29)
22%
(29)
18%
(32)
41%
(32)
22%
(29)
57%
(35)
54%
(35)
61%
(36)
85%
(34)
56%
(35)
45%
(35)
83%
(36)
38%
(34)
a Based on the question: "What type of work do they do?" (asked in reference to their three closest
relatives, friends and compadres)
*"N" is less than 5.
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TABLE 5
INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AMONG MEN IN THE THREE AREAS:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAST JOB AND PRESENT JOB
Last Joba
semi and un-
no skilled job
previous in small-scale
job enterprises
indepen-
dently
employed
factory/ salaried
large non-
enterprise manual
Present Job
semi and unskilled
in small enterprises
independently
employed
factory/large
enterprise
salaried
non-manual
TOTAL
46%
23
16
14
14%*
20
20
18
99%
(43)
99%
(49)
39
27
23
100%
(22)
14
7*
15*
100%
(13)
99%
(14)
a Based on the question: "What type of job did you have before your present
job?"
bThese figures refer to non-mobile persons.
*"N" is less than 5.
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careers. Given the country's high rate of economic growth since World War II,
one might expect the men who have entered the work force in recent decades to
be the most successful occupationally. Yet the younger generation of men in
the three areas do not enjoy a great economic advantage over the older
generation of men. Interestingly, the men under forty seem no more likely
than those over forty to hold salaried white collar jobs, even though in the
country as a whole white collar employees either are not recruited from this
stratum of the population or they tend not to settle in areas such as these.2 4
Thus, neither job experience nor age of entry into the work force seem
to have a large bearing on the men's occupational fate.
3. Intergenerational Occupational Mobility
In sum, family background limits the men's job prospects, but not because
the men directly inherit their father's line of work. Jobs for the most part
are not directly passed down from father to son. Fathers who could pass on
their line of work to their sons rarely do25 (Table 6). The children who in
fact are least likely to pursue careers similar to their fathers are the sons
of men who were independently employed. Family wealth, power and prestige,
not ownership of the "means of production" largely determine the son's
occupational fate. However, the effect is primarily indirect, for sons of
salaried white collar workers were most likely to be white collar workers even
though they could not directly inherit jobs from their fathers. 2 6
Yet independently of the wealth, power and prestige of parents, sons of
certain class backgrounds tend to be more mobile than others.24 Furthermore,
not all sons who have been mobile have moved up the socio-economic hierarchy.
For instance, workers' sons are more likely to be employed artisans or "peons"
than salaried white collar employees. As to those persons who have been
TABLE 6
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY AMONG MEN IN THE THREE AREAS
semi and un- factory/ salaried
skilled in small independently large non-
campesino enterprises employed enterprise manual
respondent's occupation
semi and unskilled in b
small enterprises 21% 4 3% 21% 33%* 11%
independently employed 34 32 3 5b 17* 19
factory/large enterprise 24 11 21 4 2b 22
salaried non-manual 21 14 24 8* 48b
TOTAL 100% 100% 101% 100% 100%
(38) (28) (34) (12) (27)
a Based on the question: "What type of work did your father do most of his life?" The classification
includes only those persons who knew their father and how he earned a living.
bThese figures refer to non-mobile persons.
*"N" is less than 5.
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fortunate enough to be upwardly mobile, many do not come from what has been
conventionally labeled "adjacent" strata. Most recruits into the working
class have not come from artisan backgrounds,28 and most white collar recruits
have not come from working class backgrounds.29
The most upwardly mobile are the sons of campesinos and independently
employed men.30 Their relative success may be an indirect consequence of the
control or autonomy which their fathers enjoyed over their work situation,
employer preference for workers or rural origin, the types of families who
migrate and/or the effect migration has on families. Contrary to the litera-
ture dealing with the culture of rural and urban communities, migrant background
seems not to impede urban mobility.
Work experience may indirectly serve to perpetuate inequality from one
generation to the next. For one, parents who exert independence and assume
a position of dominance may raise children, consciously or not, to take ini-
tiative. 31 In contrast, "peons", employed artisans and workers (particularly
workers in the small, old paternalistic factories in which most of the workers
interviewed are employed) may extend the hierarchical and paternalistic cultural
and behavioral patterns learned at work and/or reinforced at work to relations
within their homes.32 They may assume within the family the dominant role
denied them in the firm, and consequently raise their children to be dependent
and reluctant to take risks (Lipset, 1960: 87-126, and the references therein).
However, some sons of employed manual workers are independent small-scale
capitalists. Consequently, this explanation is inadequate, unless the men
pursue such work by default, i.e., because they are unable to secure other
employment.
According to social-psychological studies, at least of Americans, children
trained early in life to be independent are more motivated to achieve and
assume responsibilities than people who are brought up protected. (For a
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comprehensive summary of psychological studies of socialization in the United
States, see Brofenbrenner 1966 and the references therein.) In contemporary
America, training in independence is generally restricted to the middle class --
particularly to the self-employed middle class.33 In other words, those
Americans who exercise greatest independence and autonomy in their work situ-
ation employ childrearing techniques which result in their offspring learning
both to be independent and flexible and to exercise control over their
environment. Although these studies attribute the training in independence
to middle class upbringing, other socio-economic strata of family experiences
could conceivably induce people to employ similar childrearing practices.
Should other occupations and experiences -- particularly in societies strati-
fied along different lines than the U.S. -- demand workers to be independent
and responsible, the effect of work autonomy on family relations might be
similar to that experienced by independently employed middle class persons in
the U.S. If this line of argument is correct, it is not surprising that the
children of independently employed men and campesinos in our sample have been
more upwardly mobile than employed workers.
In addition, economic constraints prevent the children of poorly paid
manual workers from enjoying much upward mobility. For instance, fathers who
are artisans often for financial reasons either have their sons assist them
(particularly if they are paid on a piecework basis) or have their sons get
absorbed into craft activities before they are old enough to select a career
on their own.
As to migrant families, they undoubtedly are a select group.34 Compared
to the average person they leave behind in the provinces, they are better
educated, they probably also are more self-confident and willing to take
initiative and risks or they would not have moved. Moreover, some campesinos
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in the provinces exert considerable autonomy over their work situation, just
as independently employed workers in the city do. Should such campesinos be
the most inclined to migrate, their prior experience should help them adapt
to life in the capital.35 Furthermore, relative to families native to Mexico
City, they may be more determined to succeed, in order to justify their move.36
And employers may prefer hiring migrants as migrants are likely to accept
lower wages and be more docile than city-born people.
There are, therefore, reasons to believe that socio-economic factors
largely determine the occupational status of fathers and sons.
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THE DWELLING ENVIRONMENT THESIS: AREA OF RESIDENCE
Alternatively, people's economic fate may directly or indirectly depend
on where they live (1) because physical surroundings may affect people's
motivation to work, (2) because economic prospects may depend on proximity to
sources of employment, and/or (3) because housing may be an economic asset.
These possibilities are discussed in turn below.
1. The Impact of Physical and Social Environment
The center city area appears to be an "area of blight", whereas the
housing project resembles a middle class style residential community. Conse-
quently, if there is any relationship between physical or social environment
and individual well-being, as both social scientists and planners have
suggested (e.g., Burgess 1925; Perry 1929), then people in the center city area
should be least successful economically, project dwellers the most successful.
Because the colonia is neither as deteriorated as the center city area nor as
posh as the housing project, colonos (residents of colonias proletarias) should
occupy a post in between. [Stokes (1962) calls such colonias "slums of hope"!]
According to the survey, center-city dwellers are least successful in
securing factory and white collar employment (Table 7). Their low occupational
status is particularly striking given, on the one hand, the substantial number
of small and medium-sized factories located locally and the various government
offices located in the near vicinity and, on the other hand, their educational
qualifications. Since there are no factories and few places hiring white
collar workers in either of the other areas, proximity to centers of employment
in itself does not determine their job prospects.38 Only 27% of the center
city dwellers with six or more years of schooling hold salaried white collar
jobs, whereas 40% of the colonos and 46% of the project dwellers with compar-
able education do.
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TABLE 7
OCCUPATION AMONG MEN IN EACH OF THE THREE AREAS
Area of Residence
center city project colonia
semi and unskilled in
small enterprises 28% 20% 25%
independently
employed 45 22 27
factory/large
enterprise 9 33 21
salaried
non-manual 19 26 27
TOTAL 101% 101% 100%
(47) (51) (52)
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Center city dwellers' failure to get the types of jobs they ostensibly
merit and ideally want (judging particularly for the aspirations they entertain
for their children) stems largely from their class background and limited
personal contacts with factory and white collar workers, and from the socio-
economic history of thearea.
Businesses in the center city area obviously are not there
because they find it propitious to be situated near a qualified pool of
workers. Rather, factories are situated there for historical reasons: they
were established at a time when the city was smaller and when it was legally
easier to locate firms in residential areas than it is now.
Class background seems to be important for the following reasons. For
one, more center city dwellers (33%) than project dwellers (21%) or colonos
(20%) had fathers who were independently employed. As previously mentioned,
sons are more likely to pursue the same type of work as their fathers than
any other specific type of work (although this is least true of sons of
independently employed men). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, economic
opportunities for penny capitalists and small businessmen tend to be better
in the center city area than in either of the other two areas. Under such
circumstances men no doubt are more inclined to start their own business.
Thirdly, the area has been an important center of cottage industry and small-
scale commerce historically. Consequently, children raised locally have been
exposed to this type of work since they were young. The exposure, combined
with the contacts center city dwellers have locally with people employed in
such activities, probably increases the likelihood that residents pursue these
occupations. Furthermore, their limited contacts with factory and white
collar workers inhibit their mobility prospects. Fewer center city dwellers
than project dwellers or colonos are friendly with factory or white collar
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employees.
In addition, artisans and comerciantes in the center city area tend not
to move away because they enjoy the convenience of living near where they work
(if they do not work at home) and near where they purchase their work supplies.
In contrast, residents who attain white collar jobs are inclined to move away.
Their values and life-style are at odds with those of most local artisans and
comerciantes (small-scale tradesmen). The latter place less emphasis on
"conspicuous consumption." Informal interviews with people in the three areas
suggest that white collar workers in the center city area are more likely to
change neignborhoods than people similarly employed in the other two areas.39
In sum, center city dwellers' low occupational status does not stem from
lack of schooling, distance from factory and white collar jobs or the deterio-
rated environment in which they live.
Nevertheless, the success which project dwellers enjoy in contrast to
residents of the other two areas suggests that "middle class" housing may in
fact have a positive economic effect on inhabitants. However, their job status
is also indirectly attributable to their class background, not to their
housing environment. For one, many more project dwellers (32%) than center
city dwellers (19%) or colonos (8%) had fathers who were white collar workers.
As previously pointed out, sons of salaried white collar employees are more
likely than sons of other occupational backgrounds to secure white collar jobs.
Secondly, recent arrivals to the project are of higher occupational status than
the original settlers, even though they have been less exposed to the middle
class ambience of the area. Consequently, residency in the middle class styled
environment cannot in itself account for the men's occupational fate. Thirdly,
almost all of the factory and white collar project dwellers had their jobs
before moving to the project. They actually moved to the housing development
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because of the types of jobs they held (even though the project was supposed
to house persons displaced by public works and impoverished persons living in
areas the government wished to demolish). Some of the factory and white collar
employees obtained houses through their unions, for various unions were allotted
houses in the project. Other workers and salaried white collar employees
obtained homes through political contacts or by illegally buying them from
people who had originally been allotted homes by the government. In moving
to the project such persons merely "consolidated" their overall socio-economic
status. They did not in the process improve their occupational standing.
2. Home Ownership and Capital Accumulation
Urban land tends to increase in value over the years. Consequently, it
is a "long-term" investment. 40  In addition, land can be used for generating
the following "short-term" economic gains:
1. rooms can be sublet or used as a shop or workplace;
2. aiimals and vegetables can be raised on the property, for business
and/or subsistence purposes (Turner 1968; Leeds 1966).
Tenants, by contrast, can use their quarters as a workshop, but for little else
economically.
Since most center city dwellers, unlike colonos and project dwellers, rent
the quarters in which they live, the comparatively low socio-economic status
of center city dwellers could possibly stem from their being primarily tenants.
However, it does not. For one, center city dwellers are the most likely to
be self-employed and the most likely to work in the area where they live.
Secondly, self-employed center city dwellers earn more than people similarly
employed in either of the other areas. Thirdly, within each occupational
grouping the total family income of center city dwellers tends to be no less
than that of residents in the other two areas.
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Thus, even if government housing and land programs create favorable
dwelling environments and provide people with a modicum of social and economic
security which tenants do not enjoy, they tend to create "favorable investment
climates" or job opportunities for people of humble origins. Housing, therefore,
does not in itself significantly alter the "life chances" of people of humble
origins.
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CONCLUSION
Since the sample is not representative of the total population of Mexico,
the findings of this study are suggestive rather than conclusive. According
to the analysis, rural background and rural ties do not in themselves impede
people's economic prospects in the capital. In fact, people of provincial back-
ground have experienced more mobility than City-born people of humble background.
If these findings reflect a general pattern, urban poverty would not necessar-
ily diminish were migration to decline.
Socio-economic factors in large part seem to influence people's "life
chances", particularly schooling and personal contacts, and class background
indirectly. Children whose fathers hold positions of dominance either over
their immediate work situation or the general market situation apparently
have an advantage over other children.42 They tend to receive the best educa-
tion and have the best network of contacts to help them secure jobs. They also
are socialized to want and expect coveted jobs which are not directly
inheritable.
The data also suggest that skills and values disseminated through schools
and the type of area in which people live have little direct effect on people's
job prospects. Consequently, urban renewal, legalization of squatter settle-
ments and programs aimed at expanding the education system will not eradicate
poverty. New jobs need to be created which offer social and economic security.
To equalize access to jobs, the government must provide social services, such
as child-care centers, so that children of diverse family backgrounds can be
can be exposed to similar socialization experiences and similar opportunities
from the time they are born. The government also must develop an educational
system that provides all students with the same quality and quantity of
education.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The population of capital cities in other Latin American countries also
has increased rapidly in recent decades (Unikel 1968).
2. The terms class, socio-economic status, and occupation are used inter-
changeably. The term class does not imply class consciousness.
3. For detailed case studies of families within this center city area see
Lewis (1959, 1961).
4. Such areas are known by different names in other Latin American countries:
for example, as callampas (Chile), villas miserias (Argentina), and bariades
(Peru).
5. The study also included interviews with 50 women in each of the three areas.
Women are excluded from this analysis since men generally are the main bread-
winners and since employment conditions for women tend to be somewhat different.
6. The following types of occupations, based on other combinations of skill,
scale, and ownership, are not included in this analysis. However, they might
be useful in studies including a wider range of socio-economic strata:
a. Highly skilled employees in small-scale enterprises: for example,
persons employed as accountants or as technical advisors in small
businesses;
b. Skilled persons who work at jobs generally not requiring a dependent
work force: for example, self-employed "credentialed" professionals;
c. Large-scale capitalists: e.g., owners of major industrial firms.
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7. No analysis is made here of the secondary sources of employment which some
men have. If men had no job at the time of the interview, they were asked
about their most recently held job.
8. Racial and sexual differences among successive generations of Americans
are ignored by proponents of this thesis.
9. Other studies of Mexicans, likewise, show that migrants compare favorably
occupationally with city-born people. See Cornelius (1969); Browning and
Feindt (1968: 183-204); Balan et al. (1973); Kahl (1968: 175-182). Migrants
seem not to compare as favorably with city-born people at the top echelons of
the socio-economic hierarchy in Mexico. [Vernon (1963: 157)]. In the United
States, Blau and Duncan (1967) found that migrants on the whole were more
successful than people born in cities with comparable levels of schooling.
Likewise, according to a study of migrants and city-born in Milan, migrants
tend not to be at a disadvantage occupationally except that they tend to be
overrepresented among the least skilled workers and underrepresented among
lower white collar workers. (Paci 1966: 43). Rural-urban background may be
more consequential in a declining economy than in an expanding economy. For
example, Germani (1961), in his study of Argentine barriadas, found that the
type of work people did in part varied according to the length of time people
lived in Buenos Aires.
10. In the U.S. the success of Jews and Japanese has been attributed to their
education and the value they place on education. See Kitano (1969) and Wirth
(1928).
11. On the problem of labor commitment in reference to early industrialization,
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see Moore and Feldman (1960).
12. For a more detailed discussion of social class and network relations see
Eckstein (1972: Chapter 2).
13. Financially, for instance, whereas over three-fourths of the salaried white
collar workers interviewed reported earning $80 or more per month, only 30%,
35% and 63% of the semi and unskilled employed workers (in small-scale firms),
independently employed and factory workers, respectively, reported earning that
amount. In contrast, only 11% of the salaried white collar workers said they
earned $60 or less, whereas 39%, 35% and 13% of the semi and unskilled workers,
the independently employed and factory workers, respectively, said that they
did. Other studies of stratification in Mexico show similar correlations
between income and occupation. See Stern and Kahl (1968) and the references
therein.
14. Some employers actually prefer workers who are not well educated, as
educated workers may be familiar with the Labor Code and therefore demand
benefits which less educated workers would not demand. (Kazin 1972: Chapter 9).
On the question of "overeducation" of labor in the United States, see Berg
(1970).
15. The education prerequisites for certain jobs are determined less by the
requirements of the job itself than by the general educational level prevailing
in a particular society. For example, automobile workers in different countries
will have different educational backgrounds even though they perform the same
work. See, for example, Form (1969).
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16. About half of the men would like their children to attend the university.
A similar number of men consider education to be the most important requisite
for success. And almost without exception the men wish they themselves would
have received more formal education.
17. For data on the relationship between education and class background in
Mexico see the following sources: Kahl (1968: 72-88); Carnoy (1967: 363);
Anuario Estadistico (1966); and Barkin (1970). These studies show that the
education children receive varies according to their class background despite
the avowed commitment of the post-Revolutionary governments to education.
Such unequal access to education is not, however, unique either to Latin
America (Liebman, et al., 1971) or to capitalist regimes in general. For
example, the class backgrounds of university students in Poland in 1965-66
were as follows: 53.3% were intelligentsia, 26.1% were working class, 14.1%
were peasantry, 5.1% were self-employed artisans, 1.4% were miscellaneous
Fiszman (1971). Likewise, in the Soviet Union, where ownership of the means
of production is also not in private hands, the level of schooling people
hope their children attain and the level their children actually attain varies
in accordance with the amount and nature of control men exercise over the
means of production. See Inkeles and Bauer (1969: 25).
18. For instance, in the colonia, three to four times as many children could
not enter first grade as could enter. All but a few hundred children could
enter primary school in the center city area, but post-primary school educa-
tion was limited since the local post-primary school was a vocational school.
In 1968 there was also insufficient space in the schools for local children
in the more middle class housing project. However, those project dwellers
who were fortunate enough to enter primary school had access to a local
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academic (i.e., non-vocational) secondary school.
19. The data supports Lipset's thesis (1970: 127) that a particularistic
society needs to put more emphasis on universalistic standards, particularly in
the most productive sectors of the economy, in order that people be motivated
to acquire skills. For an analysis of network ties among employees of a
textile factory, a subsidiary of a large foreign-owned firm, and a large
domestic firm, see Wilson (1969).
20. The data suggests that personalismo is important for socio-economic, not
cultural reasons. The men who depend most on personal contacts are, by and
large, as educated as those who obtained their jobs through other means. If
men have contacts they obviously make use of them, for labor unions, employment
agencies, political parties, advertisements and other impersonal market mechan-
isms are of little use to men in search of work. However, personalismo is
frequently said to be culturally determined. Gillin (1966: 24-27), for example,
considers personalismo to be a distinctively Latin cultural trait, as does
Parsons (1951: 198-200). Since a 1960 study shows that 38% of Americans aged
21-45 obtained their most recent job through a member of their family or a
friend, personalismo is not unique to a semi-industrialized country. Crain
(1970: 593-606).
21. The upward mobility which in fact occurs at the bottom of the urban socio-
economic hierarchy does not signify that Mexico as a whole is a very "open"
society, for excluded from our sample are campesinos and large-scale capitalists,
the two groups which are most likely to be self-perpetuating -- in one case by
choice, in the other case partly by choice and partly by default. Vernon (1963)
argues that the Mexican business elite are not entirely recruited from off-
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spring of businessmen. However, his study dealt with executives who were not
necessarily the owners of the businesses. His study, at any rate, showed that
few people of humble origins make it to the top.
22. In advanced capitalist industrial societies, intra-generational mobility,
likewise, tends to be limited. Lipset and Bendix (1967: 156-81).
23. In Monterrey, job and occupational mobility also is limited. The mobility
which men do experience tends to be before age 25. See Browning and Feindt
(1968).
24. While the salaried white collar stratum is expanding more rapidly than
the working class, it may be that the sector is not expanding sufficiently
rapidly, given the high rate of population growth, to absorb persons from other
class backgrounds. Alternatively, men who move into white collar jobs may
choose to live in more well-to-do sections of the city.
25. For a general statement of this thesis see Bowles (1971).
26. In the Soviet Union, where individuals do not own the means of production,
family background, likewise, largely determines people's "life chances."
Inkeles and Bauer (1959: 89). The same is true in the United States and
Western Europe. Lipset and Bendix (1967: 11-75).
27. The intergenerational mobility pattern described here appears to hold
even when education is taken into account (introduced as a "control"). However,
due to the small size of the sample it is difficult to estimate with any
degree of accuracy how important class background is in determining people's
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occupational fate, independently of schooling.
28. There is evidence that in ninteenth century America factory hands were
not primarily declasse artisans either. Thernstrom (1966: 605, 607).
According to Miller's (1960) analysis of mobility between the blue and white
collar strata -- in either direction -- in industrial societies, only about
25-30% of the people in most countries experience mobility. See also
Goldthorpe (1966: 648-60). For a contrary interpretation of intergenerational
occupational mobility, based on more broadly defined occupational categories,
see Lipset and Bendix (1967).
29. Kahl (1968: 175) argues that the lou blue-white collar mobility in Mexico
stems from the fact that the country still is in an early stage of industri-
alization. To substantiate his point he compares mobility rates in Mexico,
Brazil and Puerto Rico with rates in such industrialized societies as the
United States, Denmark and France. Due to the way in which Mexico is developing
it is doubtful, however, that mobility in the country will ever approximate
that of the highly industrialized countries. Thernstrom (1964) argues still
another point of view -- that the amount of mobility which occurred historically
-in the United States has remained more or less constant since the nineteenth
century and that the amount never was very great. Likewise, Rogoff (1953)
argues that the growth of the non-manual sector in twentieth century America
reflects an upward movement of the entire occupational structure and not
individual mobility. In contrast, Lipset and Bendix (1967: especially 11-75)
argue that the "requisites" of industrialization are such that countries at a
comparable level of economic development have comparable rates of mobility,
independently of the cultural emphasis on mobility. If this were true, the
pattern of mobility in Mexico would reflect the stage of industrialization
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and not the pattern of industrialization. However, on the basis of S.M.
Miller's data (1960) the validity of this thesis is questionable.
30. Findings of other studies substantiate this point. Zeitlin (1970: 142),
for example, notes that among Cuban workers the children of "petit" bourgeois
background are more likely to hold "skilled" jobs, even though their "life
chances," as measured by education, theoretically put them at a disadvantage
in comparison to workers of other class backgrounds. In reference to Brazil,
see Hutchinson (1960).
31. For a theoretical discussion of the impact autonomy has on rates of inter-
generational mobility see Bowles (1971).
32. As is evident by the dual set of activities which employers provide for
their manual and non-manual employees, the two types of workers are considered
different kinds of people -- like distinct castes. Mexican factories, for
instance, often provide separate washing and dining facilities for blue and
white collar workers. Such differential treatment reinforces social and
economic distinctions based on the type of work people do. Thus, the relations
within the firm and within the society at large tend to be similar, both
serving to perpetuate occupationally linked inequality. See Davis (1967: 52-80).
33. In making comparisons between child-rearing practices in the Unites States
and Mexico I do not wish to imply that people holding comparable positions in
the two countries have been trained equally to be independent, but that in
comparison to the other workers in their respective countries they perhaps have
been. In general I would expect Mexicans of all socio-economic strata to be
trained to be more submissive than their American counterparts and more
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reluctant to take risks.
34. Likewise, Lipset and Bendix (1967) found that in all countries they studied
except the United States sons of farmers in non-farm occupations had a better
chance of attaining non-manual work than did sons of manual workers. However,
Rogoff's (1953: 45) study of occupational mobility in Indianapolis shows that
at a period of industrialization more or less comparable to present-day
Mexico's level -- in 1910 -- approximately the same proportion of sons of
farmers achieved white collar status as presently do in the United States.
Compared to Chessa's study (cited in Lipset and Bendix 1967:37) of mobility
in Rome in 1908, people of agrarian background have a greater chance -- though
only slightly greater -- of attaining non-manual jobs. Likewise, Bowles (1971)
finds in his study of occupational mobility in the United States that children
whose fathers are self-employed are more likely to attain white collar posi-
tions than children of fathers who are otherwise employed.
35. Fromm and Maccoby (1970) discuss social, psychological and economic
differences among campesinos. Our data, unfortunately, is not sufficiently
detailed to test whether campesinos of diverse backgrounds have adjusted
differently to the city.
36. A study of performance on entrance examinations for institutions of higher
learning in Poland also shows that students of peasant background are more
successful than those of working class background. Peasants who have made it
through the secondary school perhaps are more motivated to get ahead because
they have had more obstacles to overcome. They therefore are more diligent
and hard-working. If such differences between offspring of peasants and
workers are characteristic of both capitalist and non-capitalist societies
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we have added reason to believe that there are informal class-linked mechanisms
which serve to perpetuate social-economic inequalities from one generation to
the next along family lines, independently of ownership of the means of produc-
tion. See Fiszman (1971).
37. The owner of a large factory in the center city area, for example,
deliberately recruited his workers from the town from which he migrated. When
an American firm bought the company it continued the practice of the original
owner in order not to upset workers already employed in the factory and people
in the provincial community. For a discussion of the types of Mexican firms
which prefer hiring rural rather than urban-born people, see Davis (1967).
38. In the United States as well, residential propinquity to centers of
employment is no guarantee of work, particularly for Blacks. According to
Galbraith (1958), the problem of ghetto dwellers stems from their "homing
instinct", that is, their desire to spend their life at or near their place
of birth. He claims that such a desire to be "insulated" from the surrounding
society results in a continued commitment to unproductive, episodic or other-
wise unremunerative work. While it is true that center city dwellers do not
succeed at attaining economically and socially rewarding jobs, it is not, as
Galbraith posits, because they only have access to limited educational
facilities owing to their refusal to move from their place of birth. Galbraith
used the concept of "insular poverty" in reference to poverty in the United
States where only a minority rather than a majority of the population is poor.
Were his thesis correct, there is no reason why from a logical point of view
it would not be applicable to countries where most people are poor.
39. To the extent that salaried white collar workers have moved away from
41
the center city area, center city dwellers actually have experienced more
upward mobility than is apparent from the interviews.
40. Only about 10% of the men interviewed in the center city lived in
quarters that they owned. The majority of men in the other two areas, especi-
ally in the housing project, either owned their own home or were purchasing
the property they inhabited.
41. The processes which determine what type of work men in the three areas
under study do are not necessarily representative of the processes operating
in Mexico as a whole since the areas were not selected randomly. Furthermore,
our sample unfortunately excludes the people who have experienced marked
upward or downward mobility, i.e., the people who have been sufficiently
successful to afford housing in more exclusive sections of Mexico City or
so unsuccessful that they have been compelled to move to areas of the city
with a lower cost of living or back to the provinces from where they initially
migrated. In the housing project the majority of families who have moved
away have been ones unable to afford living there. In the area formed by
squatters few families have moved away relative to the number who have settled
in the area subsequent to the invasion. According to the residents and local
elites initially people left because they were unable or unwilling to pay for
the land. Subsequently others have moved away because they could afford better
housing. However, the people who have moved into the area over the years have
generally been of higher social-economic status than the earlier settlers and
many more people have moved into the area than out of the area. Population-
wise, the area presently is approximately twelve times larger than it was
the first few years after the area was settled. In the center city area, the
population has remained relatively stable for the last couple of decades. The
42
people who have moved away seem to have moved because they wanted and could
afford better and more spacious housing. Hence, our findings probably under-
estimate slightly the amount of occupational mobility which center city
dwellers have experienced over the years, whereas our findings most likely
overestimate actual occupational mobility in the housing project and the
squatter settlement.
42. In the case of sons brought up fatherless, their "life chances" probably
depend on the socio-economic status of their mothers or some father surrogate.
Whether in fact the same processes operate in such cases is beyond the scope
of this paper, but the problem merits systematic analysis.
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